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I.  Introduction 
1.  The introduction in the past few years of mobile devices such as the iPhone, iPad 
and Android phones has led to vast increases in the use of wireless data communications, 
and most forecasters anticipate that this trend will continue. This development raises 
challenging spectrum policy questions, including how much spectrum to allocate to these 
new uses, whether and how to re-allocate spectrum from other private and public uses, 
and what the budgetary impacts of alternative decisions might be. The answers to these 
questions also interact in fundamental ways with questions about whether and why 
spectrum bandwidth should be managed differently than any other economic resource.  
2.  In the US, the most common approach to managing radio spectrum for 
commercial non-governmental use has been to assign licenses that give the licensee 
exclusive rights to a particular band of spectrum for a set period of time. The 
development of spectrum license auctions in the 1990s helped to pave the way for the 
growth of the mobile phone industry while generating billions in auction revenues for 
national governments. Yet some of the most valuable and important innovations in 
wireless communication, in particular the development of Wi-Fi, have taken place on 
bands of spectrum for which no exclusive licenses were issued. In this paper, we follow 
common practice in calling such bands and their uses and users “unlicensed” (even 
though non-exclusive licenses may sometimes be used in its management).
1
3.  Why has unlicensed spectrum been such an effective catalyst for innovation? 
Should the United States and other countries leave additional spectrum unlicensed, 
expecting to encourage still more innovation? Or is it better to grant exclusive licenses 
for all new spectrum bandwidth to capture the stewardship benefits of private control? Is 
it costly, in terms of auction revenues, to set aside spectrum for unlicensed uses?
  
2
                                                 
1 Mark M. Bykowsky, William W. Sharkey and Mark A. Olson, “A Market-based Approach to 
Establishing Licensing Rules: Licensed Versus Unlicensed Use of Spectrum,” Federal Communications 
Commission / Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 43 (2008). 
 
2 Kenneth R. Carter, “Policy Lessons From Personal Communications Services: Licensed Vs. Unlicensed  
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4.  In this report, we frame the problem of managing spectrum as one about the 
allocation and governance of an economic resource. While selling exclusive licenses to 
radio spectrum has been a valuable tool for eliminating conflicting uses and encouraging 
related investments, it has also contributed to concentrated market structures in wireless 
telephony and created barriers to entry and innovation. Leaving portions of the radio 
spectrum unlicensed has created multiple benefits, including encouraging the 
development of complementary technologies that enhance the effectiveness of devices 
that use licensed spectrum, triggering the development of alternative technologies that 
compete with licensed uses, and promoting innovative business models and technologies 
that have brought unexpected benefits. 
5.  There is considerable evidence that unlicensed spectrum has huge economic 
value. Recent past estimates, which already look too conservative, place the value created 
by current applications of unlicensed spectrum at $16-37 billion dollars a year in the 
United States alone.
3 However, the primary benefits of unlicensed spectrum may well 
come from innovations that cannot yet be foreseen. The reason, as we discuss below, is 
that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource. It provides a platform for innovation 
upon which innovators may face lower barriers to bringing wireless products to market, 
because they are freed from the need to negotiate with exclusive license holders. Indeed, 
allocating a mix of licensed and unlicensed spectrum is attractive precisely because the 
two approaches have diverse advantages in terms of triggering investment and 
innovation.
4
6.  It is sometimes argued that a drawback of leaving bands of spectrum unlicensed is 
that governments might have to sacrifice the revenue that they could obtain by auctioning 
spectrum licenses. But it is not at all certain that leaving some spectrum unlicensed would 
reduce revenue; it might even increase it. The reason is that leaving some spectrum 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Spectrum Access,” CommLaw Conspectus 93 (2006). 
3 Richard Thanki, “The Economic Value Generated by Current and Future Allocations of Unlicensed 
Spectrum,” Final Report, Perspective Associates (2009): 4. 
4 Kenneth R. Carter, “3G or not 3G: The WiFi Walled Garden,” in Mobile Media: Content and Services for 
Wireless Communications, ed. Eli. M. Noam et al. (Psychology Press 2006).  
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unlicensed reduces the supply of licensed spectrum and, as described later, encourages 
the development of complementary, demand-enhancing services that raise the economic 
value of the licensed spectrum networks.
5
7.  One recent proposal is that auctions might serve as an effective mechanism to 
determine the allocation of licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum.
 These effects are likely to add significantly to 
government revenue and could result in higher auction revenue than if all new bandwidth 
were sold under exclusive licenses. And, even if leaving bands unlicensed were to imply 
some sacrifice of revenues, that could still be justified if the economic benefit enjoyed by 
consumers were sufficiently large. Indeed, the types of auctions used to allocate spectrum 
for licensed use favor putting additional spectrum into the hands of operators with 
considerable market power, and do not necessarily lead to the lowest consumer prices. 
6
8.  The remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the history 
of spectrum management and unlicensed spectrum uses, particularly the development of 
Wi-Fi. Section III provides a conceptual framework, based in economic theory, for 
assessing different approaches to spectrum allocation, and uses that to evaluate the 
relative merits and roles of property rights versus a regulated commons approach to 
 The idea is that potential 
beneficiaries of unlicensed spectrum would submit bids, which then would be aggregated 
and compete with bids for licensed spectrum. The proposal is akin to asking users of 
public parks to bid against developers to decide how land is to be allocated. What makes 
such ideas untenable is that too many of the beneficiaries – future innovators and 
consumers in the case of unlicensed spectrum – are difficult or impossible to identify at 
the time of the auction. As in the case of public parks, ignorance about who the future 
individual users will be or what their values will be cannot justify overlooking those users 
and values, as would surely happen in such an auction. 
                                                 
5 According to our interviews with phone company executives, the growth of demand in mobile data 
services is driven in part by consumers’ desire to extend the wireless services they have at home and in the 
office to be available at remote locations as well. This happens in much the same way that users of wired 
telephone services became the first demanders of mobile phone services. And, the ability of licensed 
networks to offload traffic onto unlicensed spectrum enhances those networks’ capacity to provide high 
quality, nearly ubiquitous coverage.  
6 Bykowsky, Sharkey and Olson, “Licensed vs. Unlicensed Use of Spectrum,” 2.  
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governing the uses of radio spectrum. Section IV describes the economic value of 
unlicensed spectrum, both in terms of its current uses and as a platform for future 
innovations. Section V discusses the policy implications of our analysis, and how one 
might approach the problem of deciding what spectrum to leave unlicensed and how to 
regulate its uses. Section VI concludes.  
II.  History and Uses of Unlicensed Spectrum 
9.  Radio spectrum is the range of electromagnetic frequencies from approximately 
30 kHz to 300 GHz that can be used for radio communications.
Radio Spectrum and Spectrum Management 
7
10. Similar applications are typically allocated in bands, which are sections of the 
spectrum designated for specific services. For example, the band from 4.053MHz to 
4.438 is used for maritime mobile communications, the band between 512MHz and 
608MHz is used for television channels 21-36, and the band from 1628.5MHz to 
1660MHz is used for mobile satellites. Some of these bands are further subdivided into 
smaller blocks that are assigned to particular licensees (in these examples, broadcasters 
and mobile telephone network operators). 
 In addition to supporting 
military and public safety applications, it is used in a wide variety of other ways. These 
include broadcast television and radio; navigation and aviation communications, radar, 
and GPS devices; computer and networking applications (e.g. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth); 
mobile phones; and other wireless consumer electronics such as wireless heart rate 
monitors, microwave ovens, baby monitors, two-way radios, and garage door openers. 
11. In most countries, radio spectrum is regulated and managed by the government, 
which decides how to allocate bands to different applications. In the United States, 
spectrum management dates to the Radio Act of 1912. The Act allowed private radio 
operators to operate in specific frequency bands if they obtained a license from the 
Commerce Department. A subsequent federal court ruling, however, held that the 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs, “Radio Spectrum,” IN Short: Toward Criminal 
Justice Solutions, National Institute of Justice (2006).  
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Secretary of Commerce had no legal basis to restrict the number of radio licenses, leading 
to episodes in which broadcasters purposefully increased power to drown out each others’ 
signals.
 8
12. Currently the FCC, an independent regulatory agency, administers spectrum 
designated for non-federal use (state, local government, commercial, and private), while 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in the Department of 
Commerce, administers spectrum designated for federal use (e.g., by the Army, the FBI, 
and the Federal Aviation Administration). 
 Congress then passed the Radio Act of 1927, which assigned most 
responsibility for regulating radio spectrum to a new Federal Radio Commission, and in 
1934 the Communications Act, which established the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  
13. Spectrum used by private entities can be regulated in a number of ways. 
Following a common, if informal, practice, we use the term licensed spectrum to refer to 
frequency bands that can be used exclusively by licensed operators for a set time period. 
A license typically defines the frequency ranges and geographic locations in which the 
spectrum can be utilized, the maximum power level to be transmitted, and other 
provisions. Licensees can expect to be protected from interference that would disrupt the 
normal operation within their licensed service areas. TV broadcasting, commercial 
broadcast radio, and cellular voice and data services are examples of applications that 
utilize licensed spectrum. 
Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum 
14. Until 1982, the FCC held administrative hearings to allocate cellular licenses. 
Prospective users would send applications to the FCC, and the FCC would attempt to 
identify which applicant would offer the greatest public benefit. In 1982, with a growing 
backlog of license applications, Congress authorized a lottery system, but this proved to 
an inefficient allocation mechanism. In 1993 Congress authorized the use of auctions, and 
                                                 
8 Barry Keating, “Economic dimensions of telecommunications access,” International Journal of Social 
Economics 28 (2001): 885-6.  
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the first US spectrum auctions took place in 1994.
9 The FCC auctions are credited with 
enabling new wireless entrants to establish national presence by lowering the transaction 
costs of obtaining sufficient spectrum. The quality and quantity of cellular services has 
increased rapidly since that time. Through the end of 2008, spectrum auctions also had 
raised $52 billion in revenue for the US government. Auctions are now the primary 
means of allocating radio spectrum in much of the world.
10
15.  We use the term unlicensed spectrum to refer to the frequency bands for which 
no exclusive licenses are granted and on which unregistered users potentially may operate 
wireless devices without specific user or device authorizations.
 
11 Users of these bands do 
not enjoy exclusivity and can be subject to interference from other users, although 
regulators typically restrict the transmission power in these bands to limit interference.
12 
The use of devices on unlicensed spectrum was authorized first by the FCC in 1938, at 
which point devices were approved on a case-by-case regulatory process. The initial 
qualifying devices included wireless record players, carrier current communication 
systems (transmission of radio signals over power lines), and remote control operated 
devices. Over time, provisions were made to permit the operation of wireless 
microphones, garage door openers, various remote controls, telemetry systems, field 
disturbance sensors (used, for example, in antitheft systems), auditory assistance devices, 
security alarms, cordless telephones and other devices.
13
                                                 
9 Auctions as a means of allocating radio spectrum were first espoused by Ronald Coase in his seminal 
1959 paper, The Federal Communications Commission, but his proposals were not well received at the 
FCC and would not take place for over 30 years after the publication of his paper. See John McMillan, 
“Why Auction the Spectrum?” (1994), for the arguments in favor of an auction process. 
  
10 Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter and Vernon L. Smith, “Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of 
Ronald Coase,” George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-18 (2010): 1. 
11 Kenneth R. Carter, Ahmed Lahjouji and Neal McNeil, “Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET 
White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues,” Federal Communications Commission / 
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 39 (2003): 4. 
12 Different countries have different rules regarding the use of unlicensed spectrum – for example, in the 
UK the power restrictions for the 2.14GHz frequency is about 10% lower than in the US. 
13 Carter, Lahjouji and McNeil, “Unlicensed and Unshackled,” 4.  
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16. In 1985, the FCC eliminated the process of regulatory case-by-case approval and 
instead set forth technical criteria to which new unlicensed devices needed to adhere.
14 
The FCC also opened up new spectrum for unlicensed use at 902-928 MHz, 2400-2483.5 
MHz, and 5725-5850 MHz. The release of the new unlicensed bands facilitated the 
introduction of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi devices that have become ubiquitous.
15 These 
technologies use spread spectrum techniques, originally developed by the military, which 
provide high immunity to interference noise compared to conventional techniques and 
allow more devices to operate in a given frequency band, thus promoting more efficient 
spectrum use. Spread spectrum techniques contrast with the older approach of assigning a 
single, well-defined frequency to each sender-receiver pair.
16
17.  Over the last twenty-five years, the FCC has made further bands available for 
unlicensed use. The 59-64 GHz band, for instance, which facilitates high bandwidth 
wireless communications between electronic devices over short distances, was made 
available in 1995.
  
17 In the U.S., as of the end of 2008, approximately 955 MHz are 
allocated to unlicensed uses below 6GHz.
18
18. Much of the debate regarding further allocation of unlicensed spectrum focuses 
on frequencies below 1000 MHz. Radio waves at these frequencies travel further and 
penetrate walls more easily for a given power level than those at higher frequencies. 
These characteristics make many of these frequencies especially useful in both licensed 
and unlicensed applications, from 4G mobile services to long-range Wi-Fi. 
 Some of the most commonly-used unlicensed 
bands are at 900MHz, 2.4GHz, 5.2/5.3/5.8GHz, 24GHz, and above 60GHz.  
                                                 
14 Thomas W. Hazlett and Evan T. Leo, “The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and 
Economic Perspective,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 10-19 
(2010): 6. 
15 Until the 1990s, cordless phones were the highest-selling unlicensed devices. In 1997, cordless phone 
sales surpassed the sales of corded phones for the first time. By 2002, the penetration of cordless phones 
exceeded 80% of households. [Michael Marcus, et al., “Report of the Unlicensed Devices and 
Experimental Licenses Working Group,” Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Policy Task 
Force (2002): 6]. 
16 Economist Technology Quarterly, “A brief history of Wi-Fi”, June 10, 2004. 
17 Carter, Lahjouji and McNeil, “Unlicensed and Unshackled,” 8. 
18 Hazlett and Leo, “The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses,” 7.  
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19.  The use of unlicensed spectrum in different bands relies on transmission 
standards to which devices conform. Some examples of these standards as well as the 
products they enable are described below. 
Technologies and Standards for Unlicensed Spectrum Use 
20.  Wireless LANs and Wi-Fi. 
21. 
A Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is a 
network that connects two or more electronic devices in a limited area using radio 
spectrum. Users of WLAN enjoy the ability to move around within the coverage area 
while being connected to the network. Unlicensed devices can be certified as “Wi-Fi” 
devices by the Wi-Fi Alliance if they conform to “IEEE 802.11,” which is a set of 
standards for implementing WLAN computer communications in the 2.4, 3.6, and 5GHz 
frequency bands. This certification assures compatibility and interoperability between 
different wireless devices. Wi-Fi-enabled devices include computers, mobile phones, 
electronic tablets, and MP3 players. 
WPANs and Bluetooth. Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) are 
computer networks designed for communication between electronic devices within close 
proximity of each other. The most widely adopted form of WPAN is Bluetooth, a 
technology standard that is implemented in a wide variety of applications such as mobile 
phone headsets, PC networking, PC peripherals such as mice, keyboards and printers, 
medical equipment, traffic control devices, barcode scanners, and credit card payment 
machines.
19 ZigBee and WirelessHART are two other forms of WPANs. Devices using 
these standards can transmit up to a distance of 75 meters at a maximum transfer rate of 
250 kbps. Applications include smart energy control systems in homes, smart utility 




WirelessHD and WiGig. 
                                                 
19 Bob Heile, “Wireless PANs tie data into home,” Electronic Engineering Times, February 14, 2000, 3. 
WirelessHD and WiGig use the 60 GHz unlicensed 
band to achieve multi-gigabit data transfer over the range of a few meters. Devices using 
this spectrum need to have a clear line of sight between each other as radio waves at this 
20 Peter Cleaveland, “Sorting Out Wireless Standards for Smart Valves and Actuators,” Valve Magazine, 
January 5, 2010, 3.  
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frequency have difficulties in penetrating walls and other objects. Applications of these 




RFID. Radio frequency identification (RFID) is the use of a small chip or tag 
that is attached to products, animals and vehicles or embedded in cards for the purposes 
of identification or tracking. Applications of RFID include supply chain management, 
asset tracking, medical applications, sports event timing, tracking of livestock, contactless 
credit card payments, and payments for highway tolls and transit fares. RFID devices use 
unlicensed bands at frequencies below 100 MHz.
22 
24.  The story of Wi-Fi, a WLAN technology standard that ensures connectivity 
and compatibility between devices, is the most important example to date of the 
enormous benefits unleashed by unlicensed spectrum. Just as cellular networks allow the 
same frequencies to be reused in different geographic cells, Wi-Fi technology allows 
multiple low-power devices to make intensive use of spectrum by reusing spectrum many 
times, but compared to cellular networks, its much smaller transmission radius allows 
much more reuse.  
The Story of Wi-Fi 
25.  The Wi-Fi story also illustrates the potential benefits to using spectrum to 
create a technology platform that encourages decentralized innovation in devices and 
business models. Wi-Fi has its origins in the 1985 decision by the FCC to open up the 
900MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz frequency bands for unlicensed use for communications 
purposes. Then widely regarded as “garbage bands”, these bands previously had limited 
uses for unlicensed devices such as microwave ovens. The Wi-Fi standard took 
advantage of spread spectrum technology, which – as described above – permits more 
devices to operate on a given frequency band while minimizing interference. 
                                                 
21 BusinessWire, “SiBEAM Showcases Growing Ecosystem of 60GHz-Based WirelessHD Products and 
Reveals Next Generation Solutions at CES 2011,” January 6, 2011. 
22 Simon Holloway, “RFID: An Introduction,” MSDN White Paper (2006): 18-19.  
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26.  Early WLANs used proprietary equipment and technologies, which implied 
that equipment from one vendor could not communicate with equipment from other 
vendors. In the late 1980s, vendors collaborated with the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in an attempt to establish a common standard. The basic 
specifications of the 802.11 standard were agreed upon in 1997. The original standard 
specified a data transfer rate of two megabits per second, using either of two spread-
spectrum technologies. More recent standards such as 802.11g and 802.11n, which 
improve on 802.11a and 802.11b, provide faster data transfer speeds and more resistance 
to interference.
23
27.  Apple introduced the first Wi-Fi capable laptop in July 1999. Within a few 
years, nearly all laptop computers were sold with built-in Wi-Fi capability and Wi-Fi 
access points appeared across college campuses, coffee shops, airports, and private 
homes as a means of connecting computers to the internet and to other computers and 
devices. Commercial vendors also sell access to the internet by offering Wi-Fi hotspots. 
AT&T alone has over 20,000 hotspots in the United Sates and 80,000 worldwide,
 
24 and 
had over 220 million connections to these hotspots in the first three quarters of 2010.
25
28.  Today, Wi-Fi-certified devices include personal computers, printers, video 
game consoles, streaming devices, security cameras, medical devices, MP3 players, 
digital cameras, smartphones, and tablets. Worldwide, about 200 million households use 
Wi-Fi networks and there are about 750,000 Wi-Fi hotspots. About 800 million new Wi-
Fi devices are sold every year.
  
26
                                                 
23 Kevin J. Negus and Al Petrick, “History of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) in the Unlicensed 
Bands,” (paper presented at the George Mason University Law School Conference, Information Economy 
Project, Arlington, VA, April 4, 2008): 1-2. 
 Currently, more than 58 percent of Wi-Fi devices are 
24 In 2008, AT&T acquired Wayport, a company that provided Wi-Fi hot spots in locations like 
McDonald’s, for $275 million in cash. [“AT&T Advances Wi-Fi Strategy with Completion of Wayport 
Acquisition,” AT&T Press Release, December 12, 2008]. 
25 “Third-Quarter Wi-Fi Connections on AT&T Network Exceed Total Connections for 2009,” AT&T 
Press Release, October 22, 2010. 




mobile devices, exceeding the number of traditional computers.
27 The number of 
smartphones in use alone has exceeded 500 million in 2010.
28 Cisco projects that by 
2015, almost half of IP traffic will be carried over Wi-Fi networks.
29
29.  The range of Wi-Fi applications continues to expand. One area that has already 
experienced considerable innovation is the integration of Wi-Fi networks with cellular 
networks. As voice and data services become more popular and demand greater amounts 
of bandwidth, cellular networks are increasingly strained. When traffic can be shifted 
(“offloaded”) from cellular networks using licensed spectrum onto Wi-Fi networks, that 
takes advantage of the Wi-Fi’s smaller cell radius to reduce congestion and use limited 
spectrum more intensively. Already a number of mobile carriers allow customers to make 
calls using Wi-Fi networks. New technologies aspire to allow smooth hand-offs between 




III.  The Economic Governance of Radio Spectrum 
 Other future Wi-Fi innovations include in-home video and Wi-Fi 
Direct, which is a new technology that supports the connection of mobile devices (such 
as mobile phones, cameras, and gaming devices) to each other without joining a 
traditional home or office network.   
30. In its early history, radio spectrum was an example of what economists refer to a 
common-pool resource.
Common Pool Resources and Property Rights 
31
                                                 
27 “Meraki Study Shows Mobile Platforms Overtake Desktop Platforms, Marked Rise of Android,” last 
modified June 22, 2011, http://meraki.com/press-releases/2011/06/22/meraki-reveals-ipads-use-400-more-
wi-fi-data-than-the-average-mobile-device/. 
 A typical concern with common pool resources is the potential 
28 “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2010-2015”;  Cisco 
White Paper (2011): Table 2. 
29 “Cisco Visual Networking Index,” 11. 
30  Elizabeth Woyke, “Automatic Wi-Fi Offloading Coming to U.S. Carriers,” Forbes Magazine, 
April 22, 2011. 
31 In economic theory, a common pool resource is a resource that is non-excludable (meaning it is costly to 
prevent people from using it) and rivalrous (meaning that individual use can deplete the resource or 
interfere with its use by others).   
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for congestion or overuse. The concern arises because individuals may not account fully 
for the fact that their use impinges on others. Garrett Hardin famously called this problem 
the tragedy of the commons. He used the example of cattle over-grazing on common 
pastureland to demonstrate the problem.
32
31. The potential for congestion or overuse calls for a governance system to manage 
resource use. For many resources, the system that is adopted is some form of private 
property rights. For radio spectrum, licensing plays an analogous role. Just as private 
property rights in land helped to resolve the tragedy of the commons for some tracts of 
land, long-term licenses, by providing exclusive use and protections against incursions, 
can mitigate the problem for some spectrum bands. When property rights are assigned for 
any resource, the owner of the resource has an incentive to maximize its value and can 
make investments without fear that its investment will be appropriated by others. In the 
case of radio spectrum, a licensee obtains the ability to sell services that use the band and 
exclude others from using its spectrum, limiting interference. These prerogatives allow 
the licensee to manage congestion and provide it with an incentive to make 
complementary investments in building out a network. Moreover, through the sale of the 
license, the government is able to share in the revenue that is created. 
 In the case of radio spectrum, the danger is 
interference from conflicting signals, and the problems of the 1930s with radio 
interference are an example of congestion externalities.  
32.  Despite these merits, property rights and the analogous system of radio 
spectrum licenses can have several major drawbacks. One disadvantage is that the system 
for allocating property rights may be imperfect. The auctions currently used by the U.S. 
and other countries to allocate spectrum licenses have been successful in many ways, but 
they also have led in most countries to a highly concentrated market structure in mobile 
communications. This outcome is hardly surprising. A basic premise in the auction is to 
allocate spectrum in a way that creates value from the perspective of the bidders. 
Consequently, licenses tend to be won by the firms that expect to use them most 
profitably and not necessarily by firms that might create competitive pressure that lowers 
                                                 
32 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859) (1968): 1243–1248.  
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prices. Put another way, auction theory tells us that the type of auction mechanisms used 
to allocate spectrum, if they work well, will tend to maximize industry profits, and one 
expects industry profits to be higher with more concentration.
33
33. Another drawback to property rights is that they can stifle third-party innovation: 
third-party innovators face a threat of hold-up. A company that comes up with a new 
mobile device or business model needs to convince the owner of the spectrum to let it 
develop its idea, and it may have to share a large fraction of the value that is created with 
the spectrum owner. If the new development threatens the owner’s existing business, it is 
particularly unlikely to be allowed. And, if the innovation requires the assent and 
coordination of multiple spectrum owners, it is even more difficult to get the owners all 
to agree. The potential for this type of coordination failure is sometimes referred to as the 
tragedy of the anticommons.
  
34
34. We emphasize that the innovation problem is particularly weighty when, for 
historical or other reasons, important innovations are most likely to be driven by diverse 
parties, some of whom are not necessarily the current owners of the spectrum. In the 
contrary circumstance, where innovation to enhance a particular asset hinges on making 
large investments in laboratories and other resources, ownership can enhance incentives 
by encouraging and protecting large investments. For radio spectrum, history suggests a 
mixed innovation and investment story, with licensed spectrum having been valuable to 
encourage the necessary network infrastructure for wireless mobile handsets and 
unlicensed spectrum encouraging a long series of novel, valuable, and unanticipated uses.  
 It has become a familiar problem in intellectual property, 
arising when product developers must license such a large number of patents that the 
process of innovation becomes cumbersome, unwieldy and inefficient.  
35. A third concern with allocating property rights over spectrum is that once licenses 
have been allocated, reallocation tends to be a slow and difficult process. For example, 
even within cellular communication bands, there has been historically a very limited 
                                                 
33 Hazlett, Porter and Smith, “Radio Spectrum”. 
34 Michael Heller, “Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” 
Harvard Law Review, 111 (3) (1998): 621-687  
14 
 
market for spectrum trading. In the United States, the creation of nation-wide networks 
from the initially fragmented license allocations took many years and major corporate 
acquisitions and consolidations to accomplish. There is no significant real-time spectrum 
market for spectrum trading, despite the potential economies in reducing congestion that 
such a market promises.  
36.  An alternative to assigning exclusive rights to particular small bands is to 
establish rules or regulations governing the utilization of bands as a common pool 
resource. In the case of radio spectrum, restrictions on transmission power are an 
example of a regulatory approach. For example, Wi-Fi operates at very low power 
relative to cellular networks. This has a downside because Wi-Fi signals do not travel as 
far, but also reduces and in many cases eliminates problems of interference, thereby 
addressing the potential for congestion. 
An Alternative: The Managed Commons 
37.  The Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom has written extensively on the diversity of 
governance systems for managing common pool resources. Her work identifies several 
key principles: the creation of clear rules that respond to local conditions; collective 
decision-making that allows the participation of most community members; effective 
monitoring, enforcement, and conflict-resolution mechanisms; and coordination between 
organizations that manage common-pool resources.
 35 As she emphasizes, these 
principles do not necessarily imply the creation of exclusive property rights; in many 
cases, alternative systems can work better.
 36
38.  As the Wi-Fi example suggests, the regulation of unlicensed spectrum can be 
viewed as a successful example of a managed commons approach. Traditionally, 
governments have regulated the use of unlicensed spectrum by establishing clear 
standards as well as pre-approving unlicensed devices. From an economic perspective, 
 
                                                 
35 Esther Mwangi and Elinor Ostrom, “Top-Down Solutions: Looking Up from East Africa's Rangelands,” 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 51 (1) (2009): 34-44. 
36 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).  
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this regulatory approach has a number of benefits that allow unlicensed spectrum to be 
part of a platform for innovation and a source of services that are complementary to those 
created by licensed spectrum.  
39.  First, the availability of unlicensed spectrum can make the cost of setting up 
and deploying systems for local wireless transmission extremely low. There are no 
licensing fees to pay, no approvals to obtain, and no need for radio frequency planning.
37
40.  Free access to unlicensed spectrum also encourages a more competitive market 
structure in the provision of wireless services, in contrast to the situation on licensed 
bands. Services that operate on unlicensed spectrum increasingly compete with services 
offered by operators that rely on licensed spectrum. For example, voice calls on Wi-Fi 
networks – in applications such as Skype – competes with calls on traditional cellular 
networks that use licensed spectrum. With a Skype-enabled phone, a receiver can move 
from place-to-place and, so long as his device is connected to a Wi-Fi network, can make 
calls without using the 3G networks. This is an example of how unlicensed spectrum may 
protect consumers from excessive market power possessed by spectrum owners. 
 
A lack of entry barriers encourages companies to develop new products and business 
models, leading to innovation and competition. In the case of Wi-Fi, manufacturers can 
develop products and market them directly to consumers, without having to work with a 
limited number of licensees that control cellular networks. This has facilitated the rapid 
introduction of Wi-Fi capabilities into new products: laptops, book readers, tablet 
computers, home security systems, smartphones, and many more. 
41.  Unlicensed spectrum facilitates the adoption and spread of new technologies. 
The increased pace of innovation allowed by unlicensed spectrum is demonstrated by the 
early appearance of technologies in WLAN relative to their introduction in cellular 
networks. Such technologies include digital signal encoding, spread spectrum techniques, 
multiple input and multiple output (MIMO), and orthogonal frequency-division 
                                                 
37  Daniel Carpini, “Why Unlicensed Radio Spectrum Is The Answer To Our Wireless Needs,” 




 38 The FCC permitted spread spectrum techniques in unlicensed 
bands for the first time in 1985, laying the foundations for Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and many 
other standards, and already the first WLAN products were appearing in the late 1980s.
39 
In contrast, the two key applications of spread spectrum techniques on licensed spectrum, 
namely code division multiple access (CDMA) and time division multiple access 
(TDMA), were not introduced in cellular networks until the mid-1990s.
40
IV.  Economic Benefits of Unlicensed Spectrum 
 
42.  Precisely because applications of unlicensed spectrum are so numerous, it is 
difficult to place a reliable economic value on their use. Nevertheless a variety of 
approaches all point toward economic benefits at least in the tens of billions of dollars a 
year. In this section we discuss some of the most significant benefits of current uses of 
unlicensed spectrum and estimates of their economic value. 
Value of Current Applications of Unlicensed Spectrum 
43.  A useful baseline is a 2009 study sponsored by Microsoft that employed a 
variety of methods to forecast the economic value attributable to three specific 
applications of unlicensed spectrum – home Wi-Fi, hospital Wi-Fi, and clothing RFID 
tags – over the 2009-2024 period.
41
                                                 
38   MIMO is a technique where signals are sent and received by multiple antennas, improving speed, 
coverage and reliability. OFDM is a technique that allows multiple signals to be transmitted at lower power 
using multiple carriers, achieving high bandwidth by having many carriers while keeping the signal rate 
low on any given carrier. [Helmut Bölcskei and Eth Zurich, “MIMO-OFDM Wireless Systems: Basics, 
Perspectives, and Challenges,” Wireless Communications, IEEE 13 (4) (2006): 31-37]. 
 The study estimated the value of home Wi-Fi alone at 
between $4.3 and $12.6 billion per year, and the value of all three applications together at 
$16-37 billion per year.  However, as pointed out by the authors, these numbers are 
probably far too conservative and can at most be regarded as a lower bound on the value 
of Wi-Fi at home. 
39 Negus and Petrick, “History of WLANs in the Unlicensed Bands.” 
40  Thomas W. Hazlett, “Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 22 (1) (2008): 122. 
41 Thanki, “Economic Value Generated by Unlicensed Spectrum”.  
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44.  Apple released the first version of the iPad in April of 2010 (just after the 
release of the Microsoft study), and as of the third quarter of 2011, had sold over 25 
million iPads over the last year. It is difficult to say how much of the value of this market 
should be attributed to Wi-Fi, but consider the following. An iPad with Wi-Fi capability 
but no 3G capability, and with 32GB of storage, retails for $599. Analysts have put its 
production cost at just under half this amount.
42 That translates into a producer surplus on 
each sale of roughly $300, and a plausible first guess is that consumer surplus is the same 
magnitude. If so, the value created with each iPad sale is around $600, for a total of over 
$15 billion over the last year.
43
45.  The iPad also illustrates how Wi-Fi can complement licensed data services. In 
one typical pattern, an iPad owner uses Wi-Fi when it is available, but switches to 3G 
mobile to operate outside of Wi-Fi hotspots. The Wi-Fi capability creates the basic 
demand for iPad services for these users, with additional mobile data service provided 
using licensed spectrum. In this example, the availability of unlicensed spectrum 
applications helps create more consumer demand for licensed spectrum services. 
 How much of this value can we attribute to the presence 
of Wi-Fi? It seems hard to believe that a product for which 3G access is not standard, but 
only an option, would have been nearly as successful or widespread, and perhaps it might 
not have succeeded at all, if users were forced to rely on a combination of cellular and 
wireline access to data and services. 
46.  Other examples of the complementarity between Wi-Fi and licensed spectrum 
come from marketing developments in various countries. In the UK, British Telecom’s 
BTFon service uses dual-network routers installed in the homes or business premises 
over 3 million wired internet customers.
44
                                                 
42  In particular, at $258.85. [Andrew Rassweiler, “Mid-Range iPad to Generate Maximum Profits for 
Apple, iSuppli Estimates,” iSuppli Press Release, February 10, 2010]. 
 Each router supports two networks. One 
network is private for the customer; the second is open to BT’s other wireless customers. 
BT uses the Wi-Fi network to offload data traffic from its wireless customers, which 
43 These figures represent worldwide sales. We assume that the economic value of all iPad versions are 
similar to the economic value of the 32 GB Wi-Fi-only version.  
44 “FON Customers Questions,” last modified October 3, 2011, http://www.btfon.com/support/faqs.  
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would otherwise suck capacity from its licensed network. A similar system is used in 
France, where, for example, SFR has installed 1.3 million dual-network routers, which 
provide a private network for the consumer and a guest network for SFR’s other 
customers.
45
47.  The Microsoft study mentioned above does not consider explicitly another 
major application of Wi-Fi, which is its use by mobile phone users. Today, most 
smartphones are equipped with Wi-Fi capabilities that enable users to transfer data using 
broadband internet instead of 3G. One benefit of the use of Wi-Fi on mobile phones is 
that it allows data transfers at much higher speeds. Another benefit is the ability to 
transfer data when the 3G network is unavailable. And, offloading data traffic to Wi-Fi 
reduces the congestion on 3G networks. Today, we estimate that about a third of all 
mobile data traffic is transferred through Wi-Fi.
 
46
48.  Again, it is difficult to place an exact number on the value created by having 
Wi-Fi connectivity on mobile phones. One way to get a rough estimate is to assume that 
users attach the same value to each bit of data, whether it is transferred on the 3G 
network or through Wi-Fi. A ballpark estimate for the value created by 3G data 
transmission might be the data-related revenue of mobile carriers; in 2010, this exceeded 
$50B. If mobile phone users use Wi-Fi to transfer roughly half this amount of data, it 
suggests an annual economic value being created in excess of $25B. 
 
49.  An alternative way to think about the value of Wi-Fi in mobile phones is to 
quantify the benefits of higher speed (an advantage of Wi-Fi over 3G in mobile devices). 
Rosston, Savage and Waldman (2010) estimate that consumers would be willing to pay 
on average $45-$48 a month to upgrade their home internet connection from “slow” to 
“fast” or “very fast”, while Dutz, Orszag and Willig (2009) estimate that consumers 
                                                 
45“SFR Femto : pour une couverture 3G optimale à domicile”, last modified October 3, 2011, 
http://www.sfr.fr/vos-services/equipements/innovations/sfr-home-3g/comment-ca-marche/ 
46 Cisco calculates the fraction of data transferred through Wi-Fi at home to be roughly 50%, and the 
combined home + workplace data usage to be 65% of all uses. Assuming that a customer uses Wi-Fi for 
50% of her home/workplace use and for 0% of her on-the-move use, the total faction of data transferred 
through Wi-Fi is about a third.  
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would be willing to pay on average $24 and $31 monthly to switch from dial-up to 
5Mbps and 50Mbps internet connections, respectively. Both studies suggest that users 
place high value on faster internet speed. If we were to assume a value on higher speed 
for mobile internet of $30 a month per consumer, and scale this value by a third to reflect 
the share of data transmitted by Wi-Fi, this would suggest a consumer value of $10 a 
month for the Wi-Fi functionality of her smartphone. With over 100 million smartphones 
currently active in the U.S., the economic value of the speed aspect of Wi-Fi alone in 
mobile phones exceeds $12B a year. 
50.  While one should be cautious in placing too much faith in any single estimate, 
the various approaches we have discussed all indicate that Wi-Fi applications on new 
smartphone and tablet devices developed subsequent to the Microsoft study each yield 
economic benefits on the order of tens of billions of dollars a year. Moreover, we have 
not even tried to account for the likely rapid growth of both smartphones and tablets, and 
data use of these devices, or for the mobile use of laptops or netbooks, or for the 
convenience benefits of Wi-Fi in allowing home networks to be set up easily and without 
cumbersome wiring, or in enabling users to connect to the internet in circumstances that 
would not allow them to be connected otherwise (e.g., in airports and cafes).  
51. The substantial benefits associated with unlicensed spectrum today, in particular 
the large value attributable to ubiquitous technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, 
suggest strongly that additional unlicensed spectrum would continue to contribute to 
social welfare. In this section we discuss a few of the future applications that might 
emerge if additional unlicensed spectrum were made available. We then return to our 
basic theme that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource that provides a means for 
dispersed innovators to create a variety of unanticipated products and services. While this 
benefit may be large and perhaps the most important, it is naturally difficult to quantify or 
predict with precision. 
Future Applications of Unlicensed Spectrum and Its Value as an Enabling Resource 
52.  Some possible uses of new unlicensed spectrum already can be identified. One 
application is “Super Wi-Fi”, which is expected to increase the range of Wi-Fi by a factor  
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of two to three as well as allow Wi-Fi to go over hills and through walls.
47 Super Wi-Fi 
achieves these benefits using white spaces – the unused bands of spectrum between used 
channels – in the lower frequency television bands between 54 MHz and 698 MHz.
48 In 
order to prevent conflicts and interference, the 802.22 standard incorporates technologies 
such as spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum access, and geolocation techniques.
49 One 
application of Super Wi-Fi is providing the “last-mile” connection in rural broadband 
deployment.
50
53.  These same white spaces potentially can be used for a variety of other new 
technologies. One example is improved home wireless networking that would allow for 
one-way and two-way video communications for applications such as security, 
monitoring, and entertainment.
 Instead of running wires to each individual home, a single fiber optic cable 
could be laid in close proximity to rural settlements, with Super Wi-Fi antennas 
broadcasting the signal to individual homes in the area. 
51 Another potential application is Advanced Meter 
Infrastructure (AMI). AMI systems utilize communication media to trace energy usage 
through smart meters. Applications of AMI include automated meter reading, outage 
management, and electricity theft detection. In particular, the use of white spaces can 
allow utility companies to monitor and access smart meters remotely.
 52
54.  Municipal Wireless Networks (“Muni-Fi”) are another potential application 
that could emerge with additional unlicensed spectrum. Muni-Fi provides internet access 
to members and visitors of a community and facilitates improved city operations, 
  
                                                 
47 John D. Sutter, “FCC heralds a new era of ‘super Wi-Fi’,” CNN, September 15, 2010. 
48 Andrew Burger, “IEEE Completes 62-Mile, ‘Super Wi-Fi’ Wireless Broadband Standard,” Clean 
Technica, August 7, 2011. 
49 Carl R. Stevenson, et al., “IEEE 802.22: The first cognitive radio wireless regional area network 
standard,” Communications Magazine IEEE 47 (1) (2009): 131. 
50 “Last mile” is the final leg of delivering connectivity from a communications provider to a customer’s 
premises. 
51 “US TV White Spaces: Usage & Availability Analysis,” Spectrum Bridge White Spaces Report, 2Q 
2010: 4. 
52 Omid Fatemieh, Ranveer Chandra and Carl Gunter, “Low Cost and Secure Smart Meter 
Communications using the TV White Spaces,” (paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on 
Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS '10), August 2010).  
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increased economic growth, and innovation.
53 There are already some examples of this. 
As of June 2010 there were approximately 110 municipalities with citywide Wi-Fi access 
for the general public, 56 cities with citywide or near citywide coverage for government 
use, and 84 cities with Wi-Fi hot-zones located in parks and downtown areas.
54
55.  Muni-Fi networks can take the form of municipality-driven networks, 
provider-driven networks, and user-driven networks. The objective of municipality-
driven networks is to provide wireless access to city staff, citizens, or tourists in specific 
areas. An example of such a network is Paris Wi-Fi, which provides free internet access 
in many parks and municipal libraries, museums, and other public places. Provider-driven 
networks are sometimes financed by private companies; one example is Wireless 
Philadelphia, which was (but is no longer) financially backed by Earthlink, thereby 
allowing Earthlink to control the network and the services that it provides. Google has 
financed city-wide Wi-Fi in Mountain View, CA. In contrast, user-driven networks rely 
on members of the community to provide wireless access to other members, together 
supporting a community-wide network.
 
55
56.  Muni Wi-Fi has proved difficult to implement, in part because of current 
limitations in the quality and quantity of unlicensed spectrum. First, unlicensed spectrum 
is shared between many users and devices, and therefore may suffer from congestion and 
interference. Second, signals traveling on unlicensed spectrum face difficulties traveling 
through trees and walls or over hills, making it difficult for Muni-Fi to be available in all 
parts of a community. Finally, Muni-Fi requires a dense installation of transmitters due to 
 There are also combinations of these models. 
Muni-Fi networks may be free, supported by advertising, or provided for a monthly 
charge. 
                                                 
53 Tobias Heer, et al., “Collaborative Municipal Wi-Fi Networks – Challenges and Opportunities,” (paper 
presented at the 8th IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications 
Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), March 29, 2010). 
54  Esme Vos, “Updated list of US cities and counties with large scale WiFi networks,” last modified June 
7, 2010, http://www.muniwireless.com/2010/06/07/updated-list-of-cities-and-counties-with-wifi/ 
55 Heer, et al., “Collaborative Municipal Wi-Fi Networks”: 588-593.  
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the limited power of any transmitter that operates on unlicensed spectrum bands.
56
57.  Some of the problems associated with Muni-Fi could be alleviated if it could 
utilize the lower end of the spectrum. Because signals travelling on lower-frequency 
bands can travel longer and penetrate objects more easily, Muni-Fi utilizing such bands 
can cover wider service areas at considerably lower costs.
 
57
58.  The examples we have given, such as Super Wi-Fi and Muni-Fi, already can be 
foreseen. Yet as the iPad example illustrates, innovation can be sudden, and the full 
extent of future innovation is very hard to predict. Certainly, it would have been very 
difficult to foresee in 1985, when the FCC released additional unlicensed spectrum, the 
new technologies and applications that would be created within a relatively short period 
of time.  
 
59.  Nevertheless, even when innovations are hard to predict, one often can identify 
resources that facilitate innovation. It would have been hard to conceive iPhone apps 
before the iPhone, or the many uses of the internet before the internet, or the value of web 
browsers before the development of search engines and commercial websites, etc. Each 
was an enabling technology that created vast opportunities for innovation. Unlicensed 
spectrum has shown itself to be a similar type of building block without which such 
technologies as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth may have not been developed, and without which 
the markets for devices and apps would be severely limited. 
60.  Between 1994 and 2008, the sale of spectrum licenses by the FCC produced 
$52 billion in revenue. This suggests a concern that creating additional unlicensed 
spectrum might reduce government revenues by lowering the amount of licensed 
spectrum available at auction. However, the reverse can also happen: additional 
unlicensed spectrum could increase revenue in several ways.  
More Unlicensed Spectrum Need Not Imply Lower Revenues 
                                                 
56 Christopher Mims, “Where’s All the Free Wi-Fi We Were Promised?” MIT Technology Review, October 
5, 2010. 
57 Mims, “Where’s All the Free Wi-Fi We Were Promised?”  
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61.  First, a reduction in the supply of licensed spectrum is highly likely to increase 
its per-unit price. If the aggregate demand for licensed spectrum is relatively inelastic 
(with an elasticity between 0 and -1), a reduction in the available spectrum would, by 
itself, actually increase the revenue that can be expected from a given auction. 
62.  We are not aware of convincing estimates of the aggregate demand for 
licensed spectrum. Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2009), however, have pointed out that in 
large spectrum auctions, the overall auction revenue tends to reflect the aggregate 
budgets of the participants. To the extent that telecommunications firms allocate budgets 
for spectrum purchases that are relatively insensitive to changes in the available 
spectrum, and tend to spend their budget at auction, changes in the available spectrum 
will have only modest effects, if any, on government revenue.  
63.  A second point is that complementarity between licensed and unlicensed 
spectrum can lead to a situation where unlicensed spectrum applications increase the 
demand for licensed spectrum applications and lead to higher license prices. One 
example is consumer wireless broadband services. The ability of smartphones and tablets 
to connect to Wi-Fi networks increases the value of these products to consumers, which, 
in turn, can increase the sales of mobile data services and therefore the revenues obtained 
from selling licensed spectrum.
58
64.  To make an analogy, suppose that a city is planning to construct a new 
neighborhood and considers allocating space for a park. Would building a park instead of 
extra houses necessarily reduce revenues? On one hand, the city foregoes the revenues 
that could be obtained by selling these extra houses on the market. On the other hand, the 
lower availability of houses is expected to increase the price of each house, potentially 
reversing the impact of lower supply. The effect of lower supply of houses on the city 
revenues would depend on the elasticity of demand for houses. Additionally, proximity to 
 
                                                 
58 Of course, additional unlicensed spectrum might also create competition for services offered by licensed 
spectrum, reducing the profits of licensees. This could have an adverse effect on auction prices, although 
consumers likely would benefit directly from the increase in competition.   
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a park would raise the value of each house in the neighborhood, increasing the city’s 
revenues.  
V.  Policy Implications 
65.  Not all spectrum bands have the same properties. Specifically, spectrum 
between 10 and 1,000 MHz has great potential for longer-range, more reliable, and ultra 
low-power unlicensed applications requiring high data rates. In order to facilitate 
innovation in new services, to encourage competition from services using unlicensed 
spectrum for ones using licensed spectrum, and to grow complementary services using 
unlicensed spectrum to match those using licensed spectrum, the quality and capacity of 
unlicensed spectrum should grow apace. 
Allocating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Uses 
66.  The availability of unlicensed spectrum must be sufficiently reliable to 
encourage innovators to invest in new technologies. If spectrum (or specific bands) is 
only sporadically available, the incentive of innovators to invest in research and 
development of new technologies and of manufacturers to build equipment that exploits 
those bands would be greatly diminished. 
67.  It has recently been proposed that auctions, rather than an administrative 
process, can serve as an effective mechanism to determine the allocation of licensed vs. 
unlicensed spectrum.
59
                                                 
I. 
59 Matthew Lasar, “Congress goes after unlicensed wireless ‘free riders’ (like Google and Microsoft),” 
Ars Technica: Law & Disorder, July 14, 2008. 
 The basic idea is that potential beneficiaries of unlicensed 
spectrum would submit bids for unlicensed spectrum. The bids for unlicensed spectrum 
would be aggregated and compete with individual bids of market participants that 
compete for licensed spectrum. To prevent free-riding by the beneficiaries of unlicensed 
spectrum, a recent FCC working paper has proposed that a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves  
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mechanism be used to aggregate bids and determine the allocation of spectrum and 
corresponding payments by auction participants.
60
68.  While allowing market forces to determine the allocation between licensed and 
unlicensed spectrum might superficially appear to be an attractive option, it is not a 
practical alternative. Auction markets work best when one can identify the relevant 
bidders in advance, bring them to the auction, inform them about what is for sale, and 
motivate them to bid.  As we have indicated, there is a diverse and evolving group of 
devices that use and benefit from unlicensed spectrum: computers, mobile phones, 
tablets, wireless heart rate monitors, microwave ovens, baby monitors, two-way radios, 
garage door openers, security systems, etc.  The beneficiaries of unlicensed spectrum are 
the manufacturers of all these devices (as well as the millions of consumers that use 
them). Even the group of existing beneficiaries is too large and diverse to be identified, 
informed and motivated to bid, particularly when individual beneficiaries cannot expect 
their bids to have any effect on the outcome. And, without knowing how many other 
users there might be or how much interference might arise, they would be unable to make 
realistic estimates of the value.  
 
69.  Moreover, the importance of innovation to capture the full benefit of 
unlicensed spectrum would make it even more implausible that beneficiaries of 
unlicensed spectrum could be assembled. For potential innovators who may use 
unlicensed spectrum, the main problems are that they are numerous and their identities 
are unknown; their participation is costly, making it hard to bring them to the auction; 
and the very nature of innovation makes their information about their future benefits 
unreliable. In contrast, the beneficiaries of exclusive licenses know who they are and can 
estimate business plans, knowing that their spectrum is protected from interference by 
other users.  
70.  These factors make the idea of an auction pitting licensed versus unlicensed 
uses untenable. Any such auction would be decisively biased against unlicensed uses, 
                                                 
60 Bykowsky, Sharkey and Olson, “Licensed vs. Unlicensed Use of Spectrum.”  
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even in cases where the unlicensed uses would be far more valuable than the licensed 
ones.  
71.  The weaknesses of the proposed auction mechanism can be demonstrated 
through the public park example discussed earlier. Suppose that a city decides to use an 
auction mechanism to determine the amount of park space to be included in the new 
neighborhood, and conducts one auction in which (1) potential residents bid for houses, 
and (2) potential beneficiaries of the park bid to reserve some public park space. Such a 
mechanism is unlikely to lead to an efficient outcome for a number of reasons. First, it 
could be hard to collect from all the future neighborhood residents bids that reflect their 
valuations of the park. The identities of these residents may be unknown at the time of 
the auction and their future benefits from the park are likely to be uncertain. Second, it 
would be impossible to assemble bids from park visitors, who would not be 
neighborhood residents but would still benefit from the existence of the park. And finally, 
there may be substantial uncertainties regarding the future uses and benefits stemming 
from the park: for example, perhaps at some point in time the park would start hosting a 
popular festival or give rise to some other innovative activities. Potential bidders are 
unlikely to have accurate information about their future valuations of the park given that 
the nature of such benefits is still unknown at the time of the auction. For all these 
reasons, the aggregate bids for park space are expected to greatly underestimate its actual 
value. 
72.  The economic case for unlicensed spectrum rests in large part on there being 
dispersed innovation by third party innovators, but then how is the spectrum common 
pool to be managed? Of course, one requirement is that the pool must be large enough to 
allow multiple uses, including new ones, and the spectrum must be of suitable quality to 
support services that complement and compete with licensed wireless services.  
Management of Unlicensed Spectrum 
73.  Given the size of the allocation, efficient common governance of a pool 
resource requires adopting restrictions on or etiquettes for its use. If the air’s capacity to 
accept pollution is managed as a common pool resource, then power plants may be  
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allowed to emit, but only with suitable emission control equipment. If fisheries are 
managed that way, then fishermen may be limited in the mesh size of their nets and the 
proximity of their boats to others in the fishery. On public tennis courts, users may be 
limited to one-hour sign-ups, and park users may be forbidden to play music that is too 
loud. Similarly, the devices that use unlicensed spectrum are subjected to restrictions on 
their power, their use of bandwidth, and etiquette or protocols that reduce interference 
with other devices. As Ostrom has emphasized, to be most effective, these regulations 
should be developed with the participation of those who are most affected. For that 
function, industry standards bodies perform a function similar to the communities in 
Ostrom’s studies.  
74.  Because unlicensed devices are low-powered, another factor that contributes to 
efficient use is the local user, who helps to regulate the interaction of devices by turning 
off (or refusing to buy) devices that interfere too much with others. Together with the 
standards and protocols described above, the common pool regulation alternative is an 
effective way to promote non-interference, allowing the bands to be used efficiently. 
And, as already argued, free use of the band is key to encouraging third-party innovation. 
75.  A variety of new technologies have enhanced unlicensed devices’ ability to use 
spectrum effectively, and the development of these technologies suggests, in itself, pent-
up demand for additional and higher quality unlicensed spectrum. Dynamic white space 
allocation refers to techniques that allow for more efficient use of quality low-frequency 
spectrum. TV broadcasters typically use low frequency spectrum (between 54 and 698 
MHz).
61
                                                 
61 “US TV White Spaces,” Spectrum Bridge Report. 
 TV transmitters typically broadcast at hundreds of kilowatts of power, and 
therefore neighboring stations use different frequencies to avoid interference. The vacant 
channels in the television bands between the frequencies used by incumbent stations are 
called white spaces. These white spaces can be used for longer range unlicensed 
communications that could also provide cheap “last-mile” infrastructure.  
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76.  New “Cognitive Radio” (CR) capabilities better manage interference and help 
use available spectrum more efficiently. CR technologies utilize a radio frequency (RF) 
sensor to detect unused spectrum that is available and capable of communications. CR 
understands the properties inherent to the user such as battery life, signal interface, and 
attenuation, which are then used in a set of decision-making algorithms to provide the 
best capabilities for each user.  
77.  Cognitive radios can also change frequencies dynamically to maintain reliable 
communications.
62 As a result, CR helps improve the efficiency of spectrum usage. CR 
technologies can also be used to ensure that new unlicensed users do not interfere with 
TV signals: when databases of incumbent licensees are available for a given location, 
devices can be instructed to avoid those frequency bands.
63 Spectrum etiquette (or legally 
binding) rules, such as avoiding occupying a channel when there is no data being 
transmitted or avoiding channels where there is already a certain amount of traffic on that 
channel, also help to manage interference.
64
VI.  Conclusion 
 
78. In our introduction, we asked a series of questions. For the first – why have the 
unlicensed portions of the spectrum been such an effective catalyst for innovation? – our 
answer is that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource that, like other enabling 
resources and technologies, encourages innovation by many parties. Licensing or 
ownership that limits access to such resources discourages innovation by giving too much 
power to the licensee or owner.  
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79. Our second question was: Should the United States and other countries leave 
additional spectrum unlicensed, expecting to encourage still more innovation? Or is it 
better to license all new spectrum bandwidth to capture the stewardship benefits of 
private control? We have argued that there are valuable roles for both licensed and 
unlicensed spectrum in overall spectrum policy. Licensed spectrum supports many uses, 
including mobile telephones and the associated 3G and 4G  mobile wireless technologies, 
as well as broadcast radio and television, satellite services, and many more. These uses 
require large infrastructure investments, from broadcast towers to satellites to cell sites 
and equipment, and exclusive licenses provides the protection needed to encourage those 
investments. But just as economic analysis predicts, allocating spectrum for unlicensed 
use has been more effective in encouraging the development of a host of innovative uses 
by a host of independent parties. Wi-Fi, in particular, played an essential role in the 
development of modern mobile phones and tablet computers, which have driven the 
initial explosive growth in demand for wireless data communications. Unlicensed 
spectrum supports low-powered uses that allow greater reuse and sharing of the spectrum 
and encourage third-party innovation. And, of course, it spurs investment in 
complementary technologies. For example, Wi-Fi encourages the building of high-speed 
connections to homes and businesses where it is used. 
80. The continued development of unlicensed technologies is likely both to increase 
the value of licensed spectrum by providing complementary services and to provide a 
platform for competing services. These effects provide ample reason for policy makers to 
expand the quality and quantity of unlicensed spectrum alongside that of licensed 
spectrum.  
81. Our last question was: Is it costly, in terms of auction revenues, to set aside some 
spectrum for unlicensed uses? The surprise for many will be that economic theory 
provides no clear answer, but we believe that the most likely answer is no. Reserving 
some spectrum to be unlicensed reduces the quantity available to be sold, which both 
raises prices and reduces quantities. So, even if unlicensed spectrum had no demand-
enhancing effects, the revenue effect of reserving some spectrum for unlicensed could be  
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ambiguous. The demand-enhancing effects of unlicensed spectrum, however, have been 
and likely will continue to be quite large. There is a strong argument that the exploding 
demand for mobile data was seeded by Wi-Fi devices, and that products like tablet 
computers, which create huge extra demand for mobile data, could not have been 
introduced successfully without their Wi-Fi capabilities. If new unlicensed uses have 
even a fraction of this impact, then the enabling resource of unlicensed spectrum will 
have a hugely positive impact on the value of licensed spectrum, leading to increased 
auction revenues.  
82.  As the demand for licensed spectrum grows, it is a fair guess that the demand 
for equally good unlicensed spectrum will grow apace. Wise policy should allow and 
celebrate that sort of growth.  
 